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†School of Hotel and Tourism Management, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom,
Kowloon, Hong Kong
‡Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering, The University of Hong Kong,
Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
Demand uncertainty is one of the most significant characteristics of the tourism industry. In a
typical tourism supply chain (TSC) for package holidays, multiple tour operators reserve rooms
from a hotel chain in advance according to their demand predictions. Discrepancies between de-
mand predictions and actual demand lead to shortages or unused room reservations, which inevita-
bly leads to reduced profits for the tour operators concerned. This article examines different TSC
coordination strategies to determine how they can be used to help alleviate such negative effects.
A game-theoretic approach is used to analyze the different coordination relationships between TSC
players. Two coordination programs are discussed. The first is a horizontal coordination program
in which tour operators exchange shortages or unused reservations with each other. The second is
a vertical coordination program in which tour operators trade shortages or unused reservations
with hotel chains. Game models are established and analyzed for the two coordination strategies
and uncoordinated conditions, respectively. The analytical results suggest that both coordination
strategies can be used to reduce the negative impacts of the demand uncertainty. The results also
show that the horizontal coordination is preferred to the vertical coordination when the competition
among tour operators is fierce.
Key words: Tourism supply chain; Game theory; Supply chain coordination; Demand uncertainty;
Package holidays
Introduction most popular form of tourism. Package holidays
are configured from a variety of service providers
such as enterprises that offer accommodation,Although independent travel has become in-
creasingly attractive to younger generations over transportation, and excursions, which together
form the so-called tourism supply chain (TSC)the past decade, package holidays are still the
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discussed in this article. A schematic diagram of package holidays may cause overbooking and lead
to a supply shortage. Another uncertainty associ-a typical TSC for package holidays at a certain
destination is shown in Figure 1. As the customers ated with package holidays is seasonality.
It is beyond dispute that demand uncertaintyat the downstream end of a TSC, tourists purchase
package holidays from travel agents. Tour opera- will lead to significant losses for business entities
involved in a TSC. Researchers believe that an ap-tors organize a series of activities as package holi-
day products for travel agents (Budeanu, 2005; propriate strategy of supply chain coordination can
help to mitigate the negative effects of demandTapper & Font, 2007). Travel agents and tour op-
erators can be housed within the same or separate uncertainty. Coordination is a pattern of decision
making and communication among a set of actorsbusiness entities. Services provided by midstream
enterprises, such as theme parks, shopping centers, who perform tasks to achieve goals (Malone,
1987). Accordingly, supply chain coordination canhotels, and transportation operators, are amalgam-
ated by tour operators. Further upstream, enter- be regarded as a pattern of decision making and
communication among supply chain participantsprises provide raw materials and services to mid-
stream TSC enterprises. who perform tasks to achieve common goals (e.g.,
maximizing supply chain profit).Uncertainty about future demand is one of the
most significant characteristics of the tourism in- A TSC consisting of multiple tour operators
and accommodation providers (i.e., hotels) in-dustry (Go´mez & Sinclair, 1991). A number of
factors, both internal and external, can result in volves two different types of coordination pro-
gram. The first occurs when tour operators reserveuncertainty over the level of demand for package
holidays. For example, excessive advertising of too many rooms and cannot fill their reservations,
Figure 1. A typical TSC at a destination. Adapted from Zhang et al. (2009).
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in which case they may transfer overbookings to turn unused reservations to hotel chains when they
have overbooked. Game models are establishedthose who have made insufficient reservations. In
this study, we call such programs horizontal coor- for the conditions of noncoordination, horizontal
coordination, and vertical coordination, respec-dination within a TSC. In general, these programs
involve the coordination of homogeneous partici- tively. The models are then analyzed to find an
optimal equilibrium for each condition. We subse-pants at the same echelon of a TSC.
The second type of coordination program oc- quently compare the two coordination models to
establish which is more efficient in mitigating thecurs when tour operators that have reserved too
many (or too few) hotel rooms consider returning negative effects of demand uncertainty. The TSC
and the different TSC coordination programs stud-(or repurchasing) overbooked (or underbooked)
rooms to (or from) hotels. We argue that tour op- ied and compared in this article are illustrated in
Figure 2.erators do not choose to offset their losses by in-
creasing their room rates. If they do so, sales of The rest of this article is organized as follows.
In the next section, the essential literature relevantpackage tours would fall and the reputations of
TSC players would be damaged. Therefore, tour to this study is reviewed. The following section
operators are likely to limit themselves to two formulates game models for the cases of noncoor-
choices: returning overbooked rooms or repur- dination, horizontal coordination, and vertical co-
chasing hotel rooms to cover a shortage. In this ordination, respectively. Game equilibria are also
study, we refer to this practice as the vertical coor- analyzed. In the fourth section, we derive some
dination of a TSC. In general, it involves heteroge- useful managerial implications from the equilibria
neous participants at different echelons of a TSC. of the game models by means of comparison. Our
A large number of previous analyses have been general conclusions and the limitations of this
carried out on supply chain coordination strate- study are discussed in the last section.
gies, with a particular focus on the manufacturing
industry. To the best of our knowledge, no in-depth Literature Review
analytical research on coordination strategies re-
Capacity exchange mechanisms can be used tolated to the tourism industry has been carried out.
smooth demand uncertainty (Hogendorn, 2006). InThere has been a particular lack of analysis using
this article, this type of mechanism is employed togame-theoretic approaches, although the effective-
examine equilibrium solutions to the reservationness of game theory in studying manufacturing
capacities of tour operators in TSCs, as well as tosupply chain coordination has been proven (Parlar
argue that the net profits tour operators can expect& Wang, 1994; Rosenblatt & Lee, 1985; Viswana-
to make under capacity exchange conditions arethan & Wang, 2003; Wang, 2002). The main ob-
higher than those they can expect to make underjective of this article is to use a game-theoretic
conditions of nonexchange.approach to examine the effects of different coor-
The literature relevant to this study can be di-dination strategies used in TSCs for package holi-
vided into research on TSCs for package holidays,days. As described above, the TSC studied in this
studies on the application of game theory to thearticle consists of multiple tour operators and ho-
tourism industry, and the literature on demand un-tels. Hotels form chains to maintain their competi-
certainty problems.tiveness in terms of occupancy rate (Aguilo´, Alegre,
The profile of the TSC for package holidays& Sard, 2002). The use of both horizontal and ver-
has been discussed by Font, Tapper, Schwartz, andtical coordination programs in the TSC is exam-
Kornilaki (2008). Both Budeanu (2005) and Tepe-ined. Specifically, in the horizontal coordination
lus (2005) pointed out that tour operators play aprogram, tour operators with a lower level of de-
key role in the tourism and hospitality industries.mand for their products exchange extra rooms
The literature also covers hotel room occupancywith tour operators that have a higher level of de-
(Pan, 2007) and oligopolistic hotel pricing (Baummand at a contractual exchange price. In the verti-
& Mudambi, 1995). Buhalis (2000) showed thatcal coordination program, tour operators repurchase
rooms from hotel chains to cover shortages or re- the main area of competition between hotels and
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Figure 2. The TSC and the different coordination programs studied in this article.
tour operators centers on profit margins and occu- Medina-Mun˜oz and Garcı´a-Falco´n (2000) identi-
fied the determinants of successful relationshipspancy rates. Tse (2003) put forward some sugges-
tions on how travel agents should counter hotel between hotels and travel agents. Theuvsen (2004)
claimed that coordination among enterprises candisintermediation. R. D. Medina-Mun˜oz, Medina-
Mun˜oz, and Garcı´a-Falco´n (2003) studied the phe- benefit the tourism industry. These studies form
the foundation for this study with respect to thenomenon whereby hotels compete with their tour
operator partners for a larger share of profits. discussion on cooperation and competition among
tour operators and coordination between tour oper-Wong and Kwan (2001) investigated the competi-
tive strategies of hotels and travel agents and ators and hotels under demand uncertainty.
Although the use of game-theoretic approachescalled for cooperation between the two sectors. D.
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to analyze typical TSC problems is a relatively change methods are used to smooth the demand
shocks in the TSC.new research area, it has become increasingly pop-
ular in recent years. For example, Taylor (1998)
evaluated the strategic pricing behavior of package Model Formulation
tour operators by setting up a game-theoretic
model. Candela and Cellini (2003) utilized differ- We consider a TSC that has N(N ≥ 2) tour oper-
ent oligopoly models to investigate tourism devel- ators (TO) denoted by the subscript j = 1, 2, . . . ,
opment strategies. Wie (2005) developed a nonco- N and one hotel chain. For simplicity, we assume
operative dynamic game to study strategic capacity that each TO provides only one type of package
investment in the cruise line industry. Garcı´a and holiday product and that the products provided by
Tugores (2006) explained the rationale for the co- different tour operators are imperfectly substitut-
existence of high- and low-quality hotels using a able. All package holiday products include one
vertical differentiation duopoly model. To the best night of accommodation provided by the hotel
of our knowledge, demand uncertainty problems chain. The tour operators reserve rooms in ad-
that arise in TSCs have not been studied analyti- vance with the hotel chain at the same price ac-
cally using game-theoretic approaches. cording to their demand predictions, which are of-
However, demand uncertainty problems have ten higher or lower than actual demand due to
been discussed extensively in other industries. demand uncertainty. The price per unit of TOj is
Fisher and Raman (1996) claimed that accurate re- pj. Following the same approach as that used in
sponses to early sales can reduce the costs result- Carr and Karmarkar (2005), all of the TOs are as-
ing from demand uncertainty. Fisher, Hammond, sumed to have identical constant marginal cost c.
Obermeyer, and Raman (1997) presented a model TOj reserves a certain number (kj) of rooms ac-
to quantify the impact of adjusting the levers of cording to its prediction at a given price (w) and
demand uncertainty. Marvel and Peck (1995) sells package holidays to tourists. We also assume
showed that return policies are helpful in smooth- that demand forecasting errors occur due to uncer-
ing demand uncertainty. Mantrala and Raman tainties, but that total capacity remains unchanged.
(1999) investigated the impacts of demand vari- Following many other studies (e.g., Hogendorn,
ability on buyback and wholesale prices. Return 2006), we assume a linear inverse demand func-
policies have been widely used to moderate the tion for TOj as follows:
impact of demand uncertainty. By contrast, capac-
ity exchange policies have rarely been applied to
pj = α − βkj − γ∑
i≠j
ki + εj. (1)deal with such problems. Kwoka (2001) studied
exchanges in the automobile industry and noted
that competitive concerns over B2B exchanges fall
into two broad categories—those involving the fi- The ratio γβ captures the degree of substitution be-nal output of the exchange participants (e.g., cars)
and those involving the products transacted on the tween different package holidays. γ = 0 indicates
that the relevant products are independent, and γ =exchanges themselves (e.g., wiring or tires) (pp.
66). Hogendorn (2006) employed a game-theoretic β indicates that the relevant products are perfect
substitutes. In this study, we consider the casemodel to compare a capacity exchange strategy
with a nonexchange strategy under demand uncer- where α > 0 and 0 < γ < β. In addition, the demand
for TOj includes a random shock (εj), with an ex-tainty. Some studies have also referred to over-
booking problems that arise between tour opera- pected value of 0 and a constant variance of σ2.
The random shocks affecting different tour opera-tors and hotels. For example, Hadjinicola and
Panayi (1997) argued that hotels should adopt an tors are not correlated.
In the following subsections, we propose andoverbooking policy at either the hotel level or the
tour operator level. This article considers the TSC analyze the game models for the noncoordination,
horizontal coordination, and vertical coordinationoverbooking problem to be a demand shortage
problem, and both return policy and capacity ex- cases, respectively.
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Noncoordination To maximize πj, the exchange capacity of TOj is
(note that remains unchanged)In the noncoordination situation, the TSC mem-
bers studied in this article do not adopt any capac-
ity exchange or return policies. In this case, the
linear inverse demand function for TOj is the same δj =
α − γ∑
N
i=1
ki − s − c + εj
2(β − γ) − kj. (8)as Equation (1). Therefore, the objective function
for TOj is
The total amount of capacity sold in the exchange
must be equal to the total amount purchased;
Max πj(kj) = α − βkj − γ∑
i≠j
ki + εj − ckj. (2) hence, ∑N
i=1
δ = 0. Combining this condition, we ob-
tain the equilibrium exchange price,
By running a game among the tour operators, we
obtain the equilibrium reservation capacity,
s* = α − c − [2β + γ(N − 2)]
∑
N
i=1
ki
N
+ ε¯, (9)
k
NC
j =
α − c − w
2β + γ(N − 1), (3)
where superscript “NC” stands for the noncoordi- where ε¯ = ∑N
i=1
εi/N.
nation situation.
Substituting equation (9) into equation (8), weSubstituting equation (3) into equation (1), we
haveobtain the expected product price,
δj(s*) = k¯ − kj + εj − ε¯2(β − γ),E(p
NC
j ) = βα + [β + γ(N − 1)](c + w)2β + γ(N − 1) . (4)
At equilibrium, the expected net profit of each
where k¯ = ∑N
i=
ki/N.TO is
In particular, we have E(εj) = 0, E(εiεj) = 0∀i ≠
j, and E(εj2) = σ2. Therefore, the expected netE(πNCj ) = β(α − c − w)
2
[2β + γ(N − 1)]2. (5) profit of TOj is
E(πj) = (β − γ)(k¯)2 + [α − (2β + γN − 2γ)k¯Horizontal Coordination
In the horizontal coordination case, we assume
− c − w]kj + (N − 1)φ
2
4(β − γ)N. (10)that if TOj needs δj, additional rooms on top of
those it has reserved, it buys enough rooms to
cover the shortage from the other TOs at exchange Solving ∂E(πj)∂kj
= 0 leads to the following equilib-
price s; if it has δj unused rooms, then it sells them
rium reservation capacity of TOj.at price. Therefore, the linear inverse demand
function for TOj can be written as
k
HC
j =
α − c − w
2β + γ(N − 1), (11)pj = α − β(kj + δj) − γ∑
i≠j
(ki + δi) + εj. (6)
where the superscript HC stands for horizontal co-
The objective function for TOj is ordination.
Substituting equation (11) into equation (6), we
obtain the expected product price,Max πj(kj,s) = (pj − c)(kj + δj) − wkj − sδj (7)
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The total amount of capacity purchased on the
E(pHCj ) = βα + [β + γ(N − 1)](c + w)2β + γ(N − 1) . (12) market is equal to the total amount returned,
which means ∑
N
i=1
θi = 0. Combining this condition,Substituting equation (11) into equation (10), we
arrive at the expected net profit of TOj: we obtain the equilibrium reservation capacity for
TOj:
E(πHCj ) = β(α − c − w)
2
[2β + γ(N − 1)]2 +
(N − 1)σ2
4(β − γ)N. (13)
kj =
α − c − w + εj
2β − γ
Vertical Coordination
−
γN(α − c − w + ε¯)
(2β − γ)[2β + γ(N − 1)] − θj. (18)In the vertical coordination case, we assume
that if TOj needs more rooms (θj) than it has re-
served (kj), it repurchases enough rooms to cover Therefore, the expected product price and the ex-
the shortage from the hotel chain at a trading price pected net profit for TOj are(r1); if it has unused rooms (θj), then it returns
them to the hotel chain at price r2. In this situation,
E(pVCj ) = βα + [β + γ(N − 1)](c + w)2β + γ(N − 1)we assume that r1 = w + ∆ and r2 = w − ∆ (w is the
wholesale price and ∆ is the deposit fee, which is
a constant). This means that the tour operators will and
repurchase rooms to cover any room shortage at a
higher price and lose any deposit for overbooking.
E(πVCj ) = β(α − c − w)
2
[2β + γ(N − 1)]2 (19)From equation (1) and the above assumption,
the demand function for TOj is
+
β[(2β + γN)2 − 3γ2(N − 1)]σ2
(2β − γ)2[2β + γ(N − 1)]2 − ∆*θj*,pj = α − β(kj + θj) − γ ∑
i≠j
(ki + θi) + εj. (14)
where the superscript VC stands for vertical coor-The objective function for TOj is dination.
Max πj(kj) = (pj − c − w)(kj + θj) − ∆*θj* (15) A Comparative Analysis of the Different
Coordination ModelsTo maximize πj, TOj reserves the room capacity,
In this section, we derive some useful manage-
rial implications by comparing the results from the
game models described above. We first compare
kj =
α − γ ∑
N
i=1
ki − c − w + εj
2β − γ − θj. (16) the results from the models for noncoordination,
horizontal coordination, and vertical coordination
Solving equation (16) leads to the following Cour- with a view to investigating how coordination can
not equilibrium for TOj: reduce demand uncertainty and the impact of coor-
dination strategy on optimal TSC decisions. We
then compare the results from the horizontal and
kj =
α − c − w + εj
2β − γ (17) vertical coordination cases to establish which
model is more effective in reducing demand un-
certainty.
−
γN(α − c − w + ε¯) − γ(2β − γ) ∑
N
i=1
θi
(2β − γ)[2β + γ(N − 1)] − θj. Coordination and Noncoordination
Horizontal Coordination and Noncoordination.[The derivation of equation (17) is available from
the corresponding author upon request.] Firstly, from equations (3) and (11), we have
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the market, horizontal coordination is more ben-
k
HC
=
γ − c − w
2β + γ(N − 1) = k
NC
, which leads to the fol-
eficial than noncoordination both to individual
tour operators and to the industry as a whole,lowing theorem.
although the homogeneous profits of individual
Theorem 1: Horizontal coordination does not im- tour operators decrease under both horizontal
pact the level of tour operators’ reservations. coordination and noncoordination conditions.
(The derivation of Proposition 2 is availableThis theorem indicates that tour operators do
from the corresponding author upon request.)not need to change their reservation decisions, re-
gardless of whether they choose to coordinate with Proposition 3: When the degree of substitution (γ/
each other. The theorem implies that horizontal β) of package holidays increases (or the level of
coordination will not result in additional costs for differentiation among products decreases), hori-
the tour operators concerned. zontal coordination becomes more beneficial
Secondly, comparing equations (4) and (12), than noncoordination, although the homoge-
we can see that the expected product price for in- neous profits of individual tour operators de-
dividual tour operators in the horizontal coordina- crease under both horizontal coordination and
tion case is the same as the price in the noncoordi- noncoordination conditions. (The derivation of
nation case. This leads to Theorem 2. Proposition 3 is available from the correspond-
ing author upon request.)Theorem 2: Horizontal coordination does not
When the degree of substitution of packagechange the price of package holidays.
holidays increases or the level of differentiation
This theorem implies that the decision makers among products decreases, competition between
within the tour operators concerned are unable to tour operators intensifies. In other words, the
change their pricing strategies in the horizontal co- above proposition implies that in a fiercely com-
ordination case. petitive tourism market, tour operators prefer to
Thirdly, from equations (5) and (13), we have: establish coordination relationships with each
other.
Vertical Coordination and Noncoordination. AE(πHCj ) − E(πNCj ) = (N − 1)σ
2
4(β − γ)N. (20) comparison of the results obtained under the re-
spective conditions of noncoordination and verti-
Bear in mind that the number of tour operators is cal coordination shows that the equilibrium prod-
N > 1 and that the degree of substitution of pack- uct price charged by individual tour operators is
age holidays is 0 < γ/β < 1. Therefore, equation the same in both cases. In other words, the follow-(20) implies Theorem 3. ing theorem holds.
Theorem 3: A horizontal coordination strategy is Theorem 4: Vertical coordination between tour
more effective for dealing with demand shocks operators and hotel chains does not change the
for tour operators. price of package holidays.
We also find that the impact of demand shocksAnalyzing equation (20), we also obtain the
on tour operators’ profits in the vertical coordina-following three propositions.
tion case are related to the scale of individual tour
Proposition 1: When the variance of a random operators, the degree of substitution of package
shock is larger, horizontal coordination be- holidays, the size of the deposit, and exchange ca-
comes more beneficial. pacity.
This proposition indicates that when demand A Comparison Between Horizontal
uncertainty increases, the benefits of horizontal and Vertical Coordination
coordination for individual tour operators also in- Rewriting equations (13) and (19) here reminds
crease.
us of the net profit expected under horizontal coor-
dination,Proposition 2: When more tour operators enter
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We can see that two variables, x and N, can affect
E(πHCj ) = β(α − c − w)
2
[2β + γ(N − 1)]2 +
(N − 1)σ2
4(β − γ)N, the value of F. First considering F as a function
of x, we find that F(x) has only one root (we call
it x1), where x1 ∈ (0,1) (the derivation of this resultand the net profit expected under vertical coordi-
is available from the corresponding author uponnation,
request), and when x > x1, F(x) > 0. Because x de-
notes the degree of substitution of package holiday
products, we obtain the following theorem.E(πVCj ) = β(α − c − w)
2
[2β + γ(N − 1)]2
Theorem 5: When the degree of substitution of
package holidays is high, horizontal coordina-+ β[(2β + γN)
2
− 3γ2(N − 1)]σ2
(2β − γ)2[2β + γ(N − 1)]2 − ∆*θ
j*.
tion is more beneficial in smoothing demand
shocks than vertical coordination.
In the following discussion, we ignore the de-
As a decrease in the level of differentiationposit losses in the above equation. (The deposit
among products leads to more intense competitionlosses have a negative impact on the expected
between tour operators, the above theorem indi-profits of individual tour operators under vertical
cates that under conditions of fierce competition,coordination. In this article, we first ignore the
tour operators prefer to establish a horizontal coor-deposit losses, which lead to inflated profits for
dination relationship with each other.individual tour operators under vertical coordi-
We now present a numerical example of F(x).nation. If the inflated profits under vertical coor-
The simulative curve for F(x) when there are sixdination are still smaller than the expected prof-
tour operators in the market (N = 6) is shown inits of individual tour operators under horizontal
Figure 3..coordination, we can compare the two coordina-
From Figure 3, we can see that when the degreetion cases without taking deposit losses into
of substitution of package holidays, for example,account.) Here, we can compare the net profits
x, is less than 0.62, vertical coordination is moreunder horizontal and vertical coordination con-
beneficial than horizontal coordination. The differ-
ditions by comparing u = (N − 1)σ
2
4(β − γ)N with ence between the two coordination schemes is anincrease function of x when x is less than 0.26 and
is a decreasing function of x when x is greater thanv = β[(2β + γN)
2
− 3γ2(N − 1)]σ2
(2β − γ)2[2β + γ(N − 1)]2 . To compare u 0.38. The difference is not sensitive when x is be-
and v, we define tween 0.26 and 0.38. On the other hand, when x is
greater than 0.62, horizontal coordination is more
beneficial than vertical coordination. The differ-
f =
u
v
=
(N − 1)(2β − γ)2[2β + γ(N − 1)]2
4Nβ(β − γ)[2β + γN)2 − 3γ2(N − 1)]. ence between the two coordination schemes is an
increase function of x.
Now let us consider F as a function of N. WeIf f > 1, then u > v; if f < 1, then u = v; if f = 1, then
find that when 0 < x < 0.8925, F(N) has only oneu = v. Dividing the numerator and the denominator
root n (the derivation of this result is availableof f by β4 and letting x = γ/β(0 < x < 1), we obtain
from the corresponding author upon request).
Proposition 4: The entry of new tour operators
f =
(N − 1)(2 − x)2[2 + x(N − 1)]2
4N(1 − x)[2 + xN)2 − 3x2(N − 1)]. (21) may make horizontal coordination more profit-
able than vertical coordination both to individ-
ual tour operators and to the industry as a wholeLet F denote the difference between the numerator
when the degree of substitution of package holi-and the denominator of f, giving us
days is sufficiently low.
F = (N − 1)(2 − x)2[2 + x(N − 1)]2 This proposition implies that an expansion in
the size of the industry increases the intensity of− 4N(1 − x)[(2 + xN)2 − 3x2(N − 1)].
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competition. Therefore, incumbent firms are likely vations with a hotel chain. The second strategy in-
to prefer the strategy of exchanging their short- volves vertical coordination in which tour opera-
ages/unused capacity with each other to reduce de- tors repurchase/return rooms to cover any shortages/
mand shocks. unused reservations from/to their supplier (e.g., a
If we assume x = 0.5 and 3 ≤ N ≤ 17, then the hotel chain). Game models are established both for
following example shows the numerical path for the two coordination cases and for the noncoordi-
F(N). nation case.
From Figure 4, we can see that when x = 0.5 Equilibrium solutions are derived and com-
and 3 ≤ N ≤ 9, F(N) < 0. This means that under pared to generate managerial implications. One of
such conditions, vertical coordination is more ben- the general conclusions of the study is that both
eficial than horizontal coordination. However, coordination strategies can be used to smooth out
when N increases to above 9, the results show that demand uncertainties and enable TSC players to
this trend reverses. That is, when the number of achieve better results. We also find that horizontal
tour operators in the market increases, horizontal coordination does not affect either the level of tour
coordination is more beneficial than vertical coor- operators’ reservations or the price of package hol-
dination. idays. When more tour operators enter the market
or product differentiation decreases, we find that
Concluding Remarks the horizontal coordination is preferred to the ver-
tical coordination.This article uses a game-theoretic approach to
One potential limitation of this study is that weinvestigate the effects of two different coordina-
have assumed market demand for package holi-tion strategies on a TSC for package holidays un-
days is constant overtime. This assumption mayder conditions of uncertain demand. The first strat-
be too restrictive. For instance, extremely badegy is a horizontal coordination in which tour
operators exchange their shortages/unused reser- weather or a disaster at the relevant destination
Figure 3. The simulative curve of F(x) when N = 6.
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Figure 4. Numerical results of a comparison between the horizontal and vertical coordination models
(x = 0.5 and 3 ≤ N ≤ 17).
Buhalis, D. (2000). Relationships in the distribution chan-may drastically reduce total market demand for
nel of tourism: Conflicts between hoteliers and tour op-package holidays at the destination. The game
erators in the Mediterranean region. International Jour-
models presented in this study may not be able to
nal of Hospitality & Tourism Administration, 1(1),
deal with such drastic changes. The dynamic 113–139.
game-theoretic models are likely to be more ap- Candela, G., & Cellini, R. (2003, September). Investment in
the tourism market: A dynamic model of differentiatedpropriate in such situations. Another limitation of
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